Saturday, 18 November
At 9.00 we had the sixth meeting. Chiang made a speech on diplomatic policy. 1) We could not have peace talks with Japan. 2) We should not accept any offer until all Japanese troops withdrew. 3) It was also not acceptable even for a third country to act as mediator as there was no guarantee that Japan would not return. 4) The Sino-Japanese Incident should be solved at the same time as the European War. It would be even better if it was solved after the European War. Nevertheless it must not be solved before the end of that war. He said many people thought that we had scored a substantial victory and we would soon have peace, therefore they advocated holding peace talks as early as possible. Some questioned whether we could score a final victory or not and feared that we could not get it. These thoughts were incorrect. We should not drift apart from principles and common knowledge to judge. We fought in the resistance war for the implementation of the independence of the Chinese race of the Three Principles of the People. If we cannot win such independence we should not stop the resistance war. If we think that our enemy has no way to win and we cannot count on our friendly nations for support then we should have peace talks as early as possible; this was the psychology of Wang Jingwei. We should not totally depend on our friendly nations as each nation has its own calculated interests. We should forgive them. So from the start we have made up our mind to prepare on our own. When the international environment is bad, we can carry on the resistance war and use the Northwest and Northeast as bases for self-strengthening and self-sufficiency, and at the same time take the opportunity to complete nation building. If we have substantial foundations then a peace settlement would be meaningful. If we do not have substantial foundations, even though we are successful in gaining a peace settlement then the enemy can easily offend again. Now, in terms of the military, the situation is quite stable. If we keep working harder we will score satisfactory results. We should not ask for a quick peace at this time as we would commit the same mistake we did with the Northern Expedition. If the enemy does not relinquish its aggressive policy we can absolutely not ask for peace. Now the enemy has no intention to relinquish such a policy, how can we have a peace settlement with the enemy? Therefore if the enemy comes to ask for peace we will feel increasingly difficult. And even if a third country comes to mediate it is not feasible because it is as disadvantageous as if we have a peace settlement with Japan. We should ask how the mediator could guarantee that the enemy would not adopt an aggressive policy. Therefore we should not have peace talks. Even though we will face military setbacks and Chongqing will fall, we will not do so. The Sino-Japanese issue should be solved with the world problem at the same time. During the early stage of the resistance war, our foreign friends feared we could not hold out. When the European war broke out, Wang Jingwei also had the same suspicion. Now we are successful in the first stage. We have to be determined that if Japan does not have major incidents like revolutions and other things, the Sino-Japanese war will end at the same time as the European war or after the end of the European war. (Interlude: During this time Wu Zhihui (吳稚輝) stood and said he was not afraid to die outside. But comrades did not have enthusiastic responses to him. He then said Ma Xiangbo (馬相伯) advocated state-building throughout his life, but no one listened to Ma.) Chiang continued to say that there would be no big change internationally. Fifteen years ago Japan wanted to partition China with Britain and the United States, but they were tricked. Therefore Japan wanted to swallow China on its own. After the 9/18 Incident, Japan’s ambition gradually became apparent. The more apparent its ambition is, the easier for us to gain success. Now when it looked back it found that the old method was wrong and knew it could not swallow China on its own successfully. Therefore it wanted to provoke the Soviet Union to come and jointly partition China. I believed the Soviet Union would not be tricked by Japan, but its conspiracy is to make us suspect the Soviet Union so as to create ill-feeling. This will turn the situation to its favour. So we should very clearly know this enemy conspiracy, and at the same time try our best to make our friendly nation the Soviet Union understand this clearly. All in all, the Sino-Japanese issue should be dealt with together with those countries in the world related to East Asia, which would be most advantageous to us and the Far East would have eternal peace. If we hope that a certain country will come to mediate, this won’t be effective. Now the method to solve Far Eastern issues is in our hands. We have consolidated our foundation in the resistance war, so we should not give up easily. We should prepare a three-year plan for the resistance war. We have to prepare the military aspect. We will have danger and experience various setbacks, but the final victory will certainly be with us.
During the break the political penal held the examination meeting in the lounge. We passed the report prepared by Zhang Qun. After the break we submitted it to the meeting and it was passed.
At 4.30 there was an air raid siren. At 5.45 a squadron of enemy planes arrived in the sky over Chongqing city. We heard the sound of them but since the weather was bad they could not locate the city area. They left, without dropping any bombs.
At 7.00 President H.H. Kung invited us to have dinner at the Executive Yuan. Wei Daoming (魏道明) told me that the committee member for the affairs of Overseas Chinese who had been announced earlier was really Chen Boxuan (陳伯旋). He also thought that there was no need for Chen to come to Chongqing to take the post. I asked him to discuss this with Chen Shuren (陳樹人) and asked him to stay in Hong Kong to help Zhou Qigang (周啓剛). He agreed.
In the evening I returned to my home. Wang Chonghui told me that Zhang Qun told him this afternoon that H.H. Kung had decided to resign his post as the President of the Executive Yuan and General Chiang would be the President in tandem. Wang Chonghui thought that it was the best opportunity to resign his post. It was because in the past two years when he headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was filled with hardships and could not be tolerated by anyone. Wang Chonghui had no say in policy, even for the junior staff in the office and he had no freedom to choose the consulates. Still there were some other difficulties he could not tell others. But if he could not find anyone appropriate to take up his place, it would be difficult for General Chiang to agree to his resignation. I said the Minister of Foreign Affairs should have the following qualifications. 1) He should be close to Chiang Kai-shek and able to talk to Chiang on various things. It also had to be known to foreigners that he was trusted by Chiang. Otherwise foreign ambassadors would not receive him. 2) He should have substantial friendships with the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover he should not be hated by both. It was because our diplomacy now needed to pay great attention to both countries. 3) He should have a high reputation so that our foreign ambassadors and ministers as well as envoys like W.W. Yen (顔惠慶), Sun Fo and Gu Weijun (顧維鈞) and so on would be happy to work with him. According to these three qualifications I thought 1) Song Ziwen, 2) Chiang take the post concurrently and 3) Gu Weijun. Wang Chonghui thought that it would be difficult for him to ask Chiang to take the post concurrently. Gu Weijun might not be willing to return to China to take up the post. Perhaps Song Ziwen was hopeful. Therefore he asked me to try to convince Song Ziwen to take it. He also asked Wu Tiecheng to relay it to Zhang Qun to help so that Chiang would approve of his resignation. As for Sun Fo, Wang Chonghui thought that he was quite careless with his words. For example he has recently publicised his talk with Stalin, which is contrary to diplomatic practice. From now on no one dares talk to him about secret documents. Wang Chonghui also told me what happened about the publication of Sun Fo’s talk with the Associated Press reporters.
 Ma Xiangbo(1840-1939) had been a Jesuit priest. He was also a leading Chinese educator from the Late Qing to the early Republican era.
 Wei Daoming (1899-1978) was a diplomat from Jiangxi who had studied in France.
 Chen Shuren (1884-1948) was a painter and politician from Panyu, Guangdong. He had studied painting in Japan.
 Zhou Qugang (1889-?) was a native of Nanhai, Guangdong. He was an early follower of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and he preached revolution in Vietnam and North America.
 W.W.Yen (1877-1950) had studied in Virginia University and was a famous diplomat in modern China.
 Gu Weijun Wellington Koo (1888-1985) had studied in Columbia University. He was the best-known Chinese diplomat in the world. He died in the United States in 1985.