Tuesday, 12 December

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Tuesday, 12 December


I woke early in the morning. It was raining but I still decided to go to Chongqing. Lou Tongsun, Yuanru and Ruchang came to bid me farewell.


At 8.20 I took the “so-called” special train for moving various bureaus to leave Dushiqiao. The train was so dilapidated. Every passenger was charged six and a half dollars. Thankfully there were not many people. I went with Tianjuan and Gong Yunzhang. I also met He An (何昂) on the train so I did not feel lonely. At 10.30 we arrived at Chongqing. Then I went immediately to Wang Chonghui’s residence at No.3 New Estate. I forgot to bring the key and silver clip, which put me in great inconvenience.


In the evening I had a long talk with Wang Chonghui until 1.30 p.m. The major content was as follows: 1) In the meeting of the League of Nations our country was put in a most difficult situation. The reason being that both sides were friends and both could not be offended. Therefore the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held that we attended as a non-voting delegate instead of voting. In doing so it was apparent we were in consistency with the Soviet Union. Britain and France would be discontented, and the United States would be unpleasant towards us. During this time when the United States turned sour towards Japan while expressing goodwill to us, it seemed unworthy to do so. Therefore even Wang Shijie (王世杰)[1] urged General Chiang to adopt the method prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When the issue was discussed in the Supreme Defense Conference, both He Yingqin and Feng Yuxiang(馮玉祥)[2] were strongly supportive to act in accordance with the Soviet Union. (Also before the opening conference Wang Chonghui asked General Chiang to consider if it was necessary to put this issue forward for discussion. Chiang replied that it was necessary so that Mr. Feng Yuxiang would know our difficulties. Therefore it was raised. 2) Georges Padoux relayed a message from the French Government urging us to have peace talks with Japan as early as possible. On learning this General Chiang was very angry. 3) Accurate news. There were four issues which Wang Jingwei could not solve with Japan. (a) Japan advocated that the puppet government should not train armies but only train guards. Therefore there was no Military Affairs Department. Nevertheless, Wang Jingwei insisted on training armies and had the department. (b) Japan advocated that China should use Japanese yen completely, while Wang Jingwei still advocated the using of Fabi. (c) Japan advocated the “so-called” economic cooperation. With regard to those areas which have been already occupied by the Japanese, they would still be under occupation. For those pre-occupation areas Japan would discuss with the puppet government cooperation on equal standing. Wang Jingwei insisted that the Japanese side should [hold a] hand out to all those being occupied, and discuss reform and cooperation based on the principle of equality. (4) The Japanese demanded the amendment of Chinese textbooks, deleting those parts on anti-Japanese activities. Wang Jingwei also demanded the Japanese side delete those parts of Japanese textbooks which were unfavourable to China. Therefore there was a great rift of opinion between Wang Jingwei and Japan. Probably we could explain Wang’s attitude by two reasons. First, the Japanese side wanted to establish the puppet government as early as possible. It was because they had propagated it for so long and so they had to make it real. What Wang did was, as a matter of fact, one method of bargaining. Second, Wang found that Japan was unreliable therefore he deliberately made such an open gesture, thus making Japan unable to accept it and he could then withdraw and show he was not a traitor. But this time Wang went too far and it was not easy for him to turn back. Also under the influence of Japan he might be unable to escape from it. If this was the case this was what he created for himself and therefore he could not complain about it. 5) He Yaozu (賀耀祖)[3] was not to succeed to the post of Ambassador to the Soviet Union. It was because Wang Chonghui talked to General Chiang about the candidates for the Minister to Turkey. General Chiang said that the issue could be decided after He Yaozu returned from the Soviet Union. He also heard that Molotov was sending a cablegram to support Yang Jie asking him not to change the Soviet Union ambassador. I thought it was very likely as the Soviet side treated Yang Jie quite well in particular its Marshal Kliment Voroshilov. Therefore the cablegram asking to keep Yang Jie was expected. Nevertheless Wang Chonghui thought it was deeply shameful that someone manipulated foreign power to counter people from his own country. He strongly disagreed with this. 6) Wu Tiecheng asked Wang Chonghui twice if the British Ambassador to China aired any discontent towards him. He also asked Deputy Minister Xu Mo the same. Both of them replied none. But today Deputy Minister Xu got the news from the Military Committee, saying that Section Chief Zhu Shiming (朱世銘) told Wu Tiecheng that the British Ambassador to China told Zhu that the Hong Kong Government wanted Wu Tiecheng to leave Hong Kong. Xu asked Zhu if there was such a thing. Zhu replied yes. Xu blamed Zhu for this type of matter and Zhu should report to the Deputy Minister. Zhu said he thought it was a trivial matter so he forgot to report it. Wang Chonghui asked me for my opinion. I thought that the Hong Kong Government’s attitude to Wu Tiecheng seemed not that bad. With regard to such an important matter, the British Ambassador to China should talk to Wang Chonghui or Xu Mo, and should absolutely not tell Zhu Shiming whom he was not so familiar with. I really quite suspected what Zhu Shiming said. Wang Chonghui was also suddenly aware that he should immediately ask the British Embassy Secretary to secretly ask the British Ambassador to China. 7) Wang Chonghui told me Sun Fo would reach Hanoi by 13 or 14 December, but an aircraft would not be available until 16 December. He was quite unhappy with Sun Fo. Even to the point with regard to the setting up of a branch of a commercial representative under the Sino-Soviet Commercial Treaty he also expressed discontent, saying it would become a major problem after the war. I explained to him that if we won the war, we would, in the future, have a major settlement with our friendly nations with regard to extra-territoriality and unequal treaties, as well as inland residency and so on. Such a trivial matter would be easy to solve. If we lost we would have nothing to say. Compared with the loss to Japan this was totally insignificant. So I thought we should take victory as our number one target now and not be calculating the rest. Wang Chonghui also raised the issue about the number of personnel. I said Wang Shijie and others did not study the clauses closely. The clauses clearly stated that only the representative and the two deputy representatives, which were three in total, were entitled to the rights of diplomats. The treatment of, and the regulation of the rest, were in accordance to those of other countries. The personnel of the commercial organs established by other countries did not enjoy extra-territoriality at all. Wang Chonghui said he did not pay attention to that point and he would study it closely. He also said that before signing Sun Fo should ask for permission from General Chiang because in diplomatic practice a so-called plenipotentiary representative was not really endowed with full-power. Legally speaking, we only did so for diplomacy’s sake. As a matter of fact, one should consult one’s senior on details from time to time. Sun Fo did not understand this point, assuming that plenipotentiary meant that he did not need to consult General Chiang, which was, as a matter of fact, a blunder. 8) Wang Chonghui said he had cabled Georges Padoux about his books but still he hasn’t received a reply from Padoux.

[1] Wang Shijie (1891-1981) had studied at the LSE and Paris University. He was a diplomat.

[2] Feng Yuxiang (1882-1948) was a leading warlord in the Nationalist era.

[3] He Yaozu (1889-1961) was a Chinese military leader who was born in Hunan. He had received his education in China and Japan.