10

Wednesday, 10 January

View Originals

Round House

Wednesday, 10 January

 

Tan Pingshan visited Sun Fo and I. He said he was now dedicating his efforts to writing, and had quite a good many reflections about the Three People’s Principles theory. He then told me that he feels quite dejected now. It is because Chiang’s close associates cannot engage with his thoughts. At the moment Chiang is not yet able to find new input, but he is also unable to get rid of the old elements. He felt really distressed. With regard to KMT-CCP relations he really thinks they should cooperate.

Ma Chaojun phoned me and said Zhang Fakui has been transferred to be the Commander of the Sixth Field Army (Western Hunan) as he cannot get on well with either the military or the political sides of Guangdong. It is a great pity for Guangdong. Zhang Fakui has been making great progress in politics in the past few years, and we hoped that he could alleviate the long-standing problems of our Guangdong a little bit. Unfortunately the old elements in Guangdong are still there, so he has to leave. From this we can see reform is not easy.

Zou Yulin invited us to have dinner at the Round House. After the guests left Wang Chonghui stayed and talked to Sun Fo and I until 2 a.m. Wang Chonghui told us that the British Ambassador to China relayed the British Foreign Minister’s cablegram concerning the issue of Tianjin silver. It said Britain could keep the silver on behalf of China. If so, our side still have not agreed, which greatly surprised Britain. If we do not agree, Britain would take free action with regard to it. Sun Fo was very angry, asking Wang Chonghui to question whether Britain wanted to befriend China or Japan. If Britain took China as an enemy, China would take the continental path, coming into congress with Japan, the Soviet Union and Germany and be anti-British. Wang Chonghui also seemed to be very annoyed, saying he had no right to talk about such a thing with the British Ambassador. Sun Fo said when he met the British Ambassador this Friday he would tell the latter. I urged him not to do so in a hurry because of what Wang Chonghui said that he  dare to do so as Wang was unclear what General Chiang thought, therefore Wang Chonghui should not say anything carelessly. It was because if Wang Chonghui said something what if General Chiang told the British Ambassador something else, others would not respect his status as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in the future he would be unable to deal with diplomac matters. Even for Sun Fo I also urged him not to make any stern remarks which would place him in difficulty. Wang Chonghui also recounted how changeable General Chiang was, and how difficult he was to work with. Wang Chonghui added that if it were not for the resistance war he would long ago have resigned his post. He said “I am the damnest (sic) fool to be the Foreign Minister”. Sun Fo calmed down a little bit. We then examined General Chiang’s diplomatic policy. I and Wang Chonghui had to tell him the details that, with regard to the Sino-Soviet Commercial Treaty, General Chiang had changed his attitude 6 times in total. We did it so as to avoid his taking any irrational action because of a one-off rage. He also deeply understood our purpose. When Wang Chonghui left, he and Wang Chonghui were reconciled.