By Yixiao Zheng
The Kuomintang government was said to have been making active military preparations for the counterattack and national recovery campaign in 1965. On New Year’s Day, President Chiang Kai-shek reminded his fellow countrymen about the adversity of the current political and international situation in his New Year’s speech. Despite the death of his long-time deputy (Vice President Chen Cheng) in March, Chiang went about the military preparations as usual, and was said to have been fully occupied in military affairs in April. Tensions remained high across the Taiwan Strait. In May, the R.O.C. Navy Patrol Craft 119 made a gallant and successful breakout attempt and suffered heavy casualties after it was besieged and attacked by ten Chinese Communist gunboats. The President was also said to have been deeply upset about the government’s standing with the people, as Chiang reportedly blamed the KMT Party Committee(s), the police force and the judiciary and prosecution services for alienating the Taiwanese. The diary also shows that Chiang Kai-shek seemed to be most concerned about not only the U.S. attitude towards his counterattack and national recovery campaign but also the Soviet response in the event. Ma Chaojun told Fu that Chiang had put two questions to the KMT Central Standing Committee: how should the government respond if the United States were to oppose or withhold its support for the counterattack, and what should be the Kuomintang’s strategy in the eventuality of the Soviet Union seizing the opportunity to establish Communist puppet regime(s) in the border regions of Xinjiang, Manchuria and Mongolia during the Nationalist counteroffensive?
When consulted by Ma Chaojun about Chiang’s two strategic concerns, Fu expressed his reservation about a premature move. In his view, a forced counterattack, which was carried out against the American will and intended to elicit U.S. support, would not help at all, because it would not only make President Johnson’s position more difficult but also fuel the fear of entrapment by vindicating the American perception that the R.O.C. was deliberately trying to embroil the United States in a dangerous and unwanted war with China; but if the United States were to step up its military intervention and become directly engaged in the Vietnam War against North Vietnam and Communist China, the strategic value of the R.O.C.’s military would naturally increase as America would have come to appreciate and rely more on the R.O.C.’s strategic support, and by that time, the United States government would surely give its blessing to the planned counterattack by the R.O.C. armed forces. As to the Soviet question, citing what Sun Yat-sen had said to Fu on several occasions about the importance of a down-to-earth approach to the revolutionary work and the necessity of building up one’s own strength and power before gradually carrying out one’s strategy, Fu advised against discussing the issue of the Soviet threat prematurely before regaining the Chinese mainland, for to do so would arouse American fears and anxiety over the R.O.C.’s intentions and might even encourage the Soviet Union to adjust its anti-Mao policy, and neither implication would do the R.O.C. any good. This is arguably the only reference to Fu’s personal opinion on this important subject found in the diaries during his final years in Taiwan. And readers could judge whether his advice was a thoughtful and pragmatic approach based on a sober assessment of the international situation.
As already mentioned, Vice President Chen Cheng passed away in March this year. According to the diary, Chiang Kai-shek and the Vice President’s close family members had already been informed in September 1963 that Chen had liver cancer, but the severity of the condition had been kept secret from Chen himself until days before he died. Fu noted the situation in the final days and hours before the Vice President’s death, made some references to the arrangements for the public memorial service held in his honour, and kindly expressed his high regard for Chen’s commendable political character and legacy in public service. Interestingly, the diary also contains references to stories about the Vice President that illustrate some of the dynamics in Chen’s relations with other people. For instance, it was noted that Chiang Kai-shek once instructed Chen Xueping to submit the minutes of Chen’s private meeting with Hu Shi, Mei Yiqi and Xue Yue; Fu also learned that President Yu Youren of the Control Yuan had fallen out with the Vice President because of the latter’s response to the appointment of Yu’s close friend Wu Jiayuan as supervisor of the Bank of Communications (Chiao Tung Bank), and that Yu had almost prepared to impeach the Vice President, only dissuaded by others; some said Chen Cheng was a rather difficult man, and during his time in Manchuria his leadership style had alienated many civilian and military officials there and consequently contributed to Chiang’s unpopularity among those high-ranking cadres.
This diary also contains interesting references to other political developments inside the Kuomintang regime in 1965. At the beginning of this year, the diary notes a string of personnel changes in the government. In January, Yang Jizeng, after serving as Minister of Economic Affairs for eight years, unexpectedly stepped down and was subsequently replaced by Li Guoding; Chiang Ching-kuo was promoted to Minister of National Defence; Huang Jilu was appointed as Chairman of the KMT Central Planning and Evaluation Committee after resigning from the Ministry of Education where he was succeeded by Yan Zhenxing as Minister of Education. Hu Jianzhong was appointed Chairman of the Central Pictures Corporation. Fu noted the reasons for Yang Jizeng’s removal as Minister of Economic Affairs, and also described the extravagant and frivolous private lifestyle of Zhou Zhirou, which had reportedly led to his removal. However, there was also speculation that if the leadership should decide to launch a military campaign, there would be bound to be a cabinet reshuffle of the Executive Yuan, with Zhou Zhirou becoming the Premier. The diary makes a passing reference to the precarious positions of Huang Jie and Huang Chaoqin in 1965. Fu’s diary also notes the speculation and hearsay about Chen’s successor that had emerged in 1965, including names such as Zhang Daofan, Gu Zhenggang and even Sun Ke that were circulating as possible contenders for the KMT’s vice presidency. Fu also noted his private conversation with Zhang Qun, President Chiang’s right-hand man, about the issue. Fu learned that the Party’s Central Committee had grown increasingly afraid of intervening and pressuring the Control Yuan to act in accordance with the Party’s instructions; nor would such an intervention be necessarily effective. Fu noted what he had heard about Tao Baichaun’s relationship with Du Yuesheng, as well as the lack of support among his fellow ombudsmen for what was said to be Tao’s overblown political ambitions as Tao sought to contend for the presidency of the Control Yuan. Fu also noted what Ma Chaojun had told him about the Party’s Central Standing Committee’s deliberations on the punishment for Cao Dexun’s advocacy of a ‘Two China’ policy and his scathing public attack on the Party and the government. After attending the fourth meeting of the Ninth Central Advisory Committee in July, Fu gave a fairly detailed account of Minister of Economic Affairs Li Guoding’s report on the current situation of Taiwan’s economic development. The diary also notes the Third Party Small Group’s deliberations on whether a stock exchange should be established in Taiwan; Fu wrote that both Yan Jiagan and Ye Gongchao were opposed to the idea, and a report by a U.S. expert also advised against the move, suggesting that it was premature to set up a stock exchange just then.
As the Republic of China would soon begin to celebrate the centenary of Dr Sun Yat-sen’s birth, preparations were already in full swing in 1965. Fu had attended a number of the meetings of the Preparatory Committee of the Centenary Commemoration of the Founding Father of the Nation in the first half of 1965. Insofar as Fu was concerned, the diary shows that he had played an important role in assisting the return of some precious first-hand historical material concerning Sun Yat-sun during the early years of China’s republican revolution from the United States. This collection of material consisted of Sun Yat-sen’s personal letters to Charles B. Boothe sent from a number of places between 1910 and 1911 as well as some other documents (including some of Rong Hong’s letters). Charles Boothe was a close friend of Sun Yat-sen (who used to live in Boothe’s home for a long time) and also a member of the Tung Meng Hui (United League/Society of the Common Cause/Chinese Revolutionary Alliance) responsible for its overseas fundraising activities. Charles Boothe’s son, Lanrence Boothe, was a friend of Sun Ke and both of them had attended the University of California, Berkeley. Lanrence Boothe had recently discovered his father’s collection of Sun’s handwritten English letters and decided to donate the original copies to the Hoover Library of Stanford University and to show some of the photocopies to the relevant people in Taiwan during his trip to the Far East. Sun Ke therefore sent some of the sample copies of his father’s letters to Fu in March and asked Fu to help arrange a meeting with Laurence Boothe and his wife during their stay in Taiwan as Mr and Mrs Laurence Boothe would take the photocopies of the so-called ‘Boothe Papers’ with them during the trip. The diary contains a great deal of information about what Fu had done in preparation for the arrival of the Boothes and the documents in April, especially his discussion and collaboration with Luo Jialun, who was the President of Academia Historica. Upon Zhang Qun’s advice, Fu and Luo also jointly requested President Chiang to grant the Boothes an audience during their trip in Taiwan. Fu wrote about the circumstances surrounding their meeting with Chiang and the warm reception held by Madam Chiang to welcome the American couple. The arrival of these documents had come to be seen as a significant addition to the centenary celebration of Sun Yat-sen’s birth to be held at the end of the year in Taiwan. Photocopies of the ‘Boothe Papers’ would be deposited in Academia Historica. Fu personally would also receive a set of copies from the Boothes. Some original press clippings about the return of the ‘Boothe papers’ were also enclosed in this diary, in addition to one copy of Sun Yat-sen’s private letter to Charles Boothe. Following the Boothes’ visit, Sun Ke also wrote to Fu telling him that he had found Sun Yat-sen’s cry for help letter to Dr James Cantlie during his kidnapping in London by the secret service of the imperial Qing government; the letter had been in the safe keeping of former R.O.C. Ambassador to Britain, Guo Taiqi, who was given the letter by the descendants of James Cantlie; Madam Guo discovered the letter after her relocation to San Diego, and handed it over to Sun Ke thereafter. Sun also told Fu that, among his documents, he had come across the original (handwritten) manuscript of Sun Yat-sen’s ‘Fundamentals of National Reconstruction’ written during his time in Guangzhou as well as his correspondence with other revolutionary veterans and elder statesmen during that period. Fu was asked to give his opinion as to whether those documents should be photocopied and brought back to Taiwan as well, and to consult Wang Yunwu about this matter. Fu discussed this with Wang Yunwu and Luo Jialun, and all agreed that Sun Ke should bring these documents with him when he returned to Taiwan in October. Fu also noted that this year Wu Desheng was invited to write a biography of Sun Yat-sen in the English language, and Sun Ke had offered some personal suggestions as to how to proceed with the task, with which Fu had completely agreed.
The relics of the Founding Father’s revolutionary life had been one of the significant issues discussed through the exchange of letters between Fu and Sun Ke, who had been in correspondence for months especially since Fu returned from his overseas trip at the end of 1964. What the above-mentioned exchange has clearly shown is a long-standing relationship between the two persons. This is all the more so in their deliberations on the question of Sun Ke’s return to Taiwan from the United States, where Fu’s enduring friendship with Sun Ke was most vividly demonstrated by the complete trust Sun had put in Fu. Sun Ke had indicated to Fu that he was hoping to return to Taiwan in October to take part in the centenary celebration of Sun Yat-sen’s birth in Taiwan this year. However, Sun Ke had found himself hamstrung by his personal financial circumstances in the United States due to difficulties he had encountered in land business in California. By the end of 1964, Sun had an outstanding debt of around US$40,000 and he would have to pay off a large part of his debt before he could leave the United States. Fu had also learned that the problematic financial situation of Sun Ke and his wife had been compounded by family difficulties. As already mentioned in the introduction to the 1964 diary, Sun Ke had sent several letters to Fu at the end of 1964 asking for help. Fu had been trying hard to explore ways to help him. This diary notes Fu’s continuing efforts in this regard, including how he had tried to approach people such as Zhang Qun, Ma Chaojun, Lin Boshou and others during the process. While efforts had been made to persuade Chen Guangfu (who was one of Sun’s creditors and was in Hong Kong) to grant a deferment of repayment, the main thrust of Fu’s efforts was to ask for a favour from President Chiang Kai-shek to help Sun out. Fu was summoned by President Chiang on 4th February to discuss the matter and Fu gave a detailed account of his meeting with Chiang, whose attitude was said to be rather encouraging according to the diary. Nonetheless, Sun Ke had become increasingly anxious in the early months of 1965 because a significant amount of debt was about to become due for repayment (by 20th March); and it had also come to a point where Fu could no longer do anything except wait to hear back from the President’s office and repeatedly reassure Sun in his letters. The good news finally arrived when Chiang decided in February to instruct the Party’s Central Committee to remit US$20,000 directly to Sun Ke, and Fu was asked to keep it discreet. According to Madam Chiang, after careful consideration both she and President Chiang thought that this would be the most suitable arrangement. With the financial relief provided by the President, Sun Ke was able to clear the debt owed to the bank; and the remaining debt, which he had incurred from outstanding legal costs, could be settled by himself in due course. Fu was delighted that Sun Ke could come to Taiwan, not least because that had always been his wish. However, it disturbed Fu to see that speculation over Sun Ke’s return had quickly surfaced and rumours about his reinstatement had begun to spread. Fu naturally denied those rumours of Sun’s political plans. Indeed, Fu had always been very cautious about this as he had wanted to make it clear to President Chiang and peoples such as Zhang Qun that Sun Ke had no plan whatsoever to return to politics; and Fu had also explicitly advised Sun Ke not to ask for any political favours upon his return to Taiwan, and suggested that the best course of action would be to follow whatever instructions and plans that he may receive from President Chiang and Madam Chiang, who he believed would surely make the necessary arrangements for his life after his return. Fu informed Sun Ke about the rumours circulating about his future move. After being told about the political developments, Sun Ke chose to entrust Fu with the task of clarifying his position and clearing up any misunderstanding regarding his future plans in Taiwan, where Sun Ke indicated that, after many years of retirement, he was unwilling to take up any job in government and he also believed that he was no longer suitable for political work. Fu therefore talked to journalists during press interviews about Sun Ke’s recent situation and the circumstances surrounding his personal visit to Sun Ke in California. Fu also disclosed that Sun Ke would return in October to take part in the events celebrating the centenary of the birth of the Founding Father and would stay in Taiwan for three or four months before going back to the United States. In the diary, readers could find interesting press cuttings of the relevant news articles on what Fu had said about these issues. At the same time, Fu also went to some lengths to appeal to Sun Ke’s supporters in Taiwan to refrain from any manoeuvres that might compound Sun’s difficulties. Fu also played a role in helping Sun Ke to obtain a new passport and gladly signed a joint letter with dozens of Sun Ke’s friends to greet their old friend. In the diary, Fu also noted some people’s dissatisfaction with Liang Hancao, who was a long-time friend of Sun Ke and had recently unwisely talked to the newspaper about Sun Ke’s past weaknesses decades ago.
The 1965 diary highlights a number of cases heard by the Commission on the Disciplinary Sanctions of Functionaries. The Commissioners came to a unanimous decision to acquit Xia Weishang, the Chief Prosecutor of the Taiwan High Prosecutors Office, of all charges; the report of the decision, which had been leaked to the media, infuriated members of the Control Yuan. The thorny case involving the four judges of the Taiwan High Court and the Supreme Court who had handled the Huang Qirui case was finally brought to a conclusion this year; though some of the Commissioners had found it difficult to fully acquit the judges of the Supreme Court, they nonetheless agreed to cooperate and comply with the instructions of President Chiang and the Party’s Central Committee after Fu and his colleagues (Gu Ruxun and President Xie Guansheng of the Judicial Yuan) earnestly persuaded them to respect the decision of the party and went to considerable lengths to explain the supreme leader’s intentions and the potential political complications that might arise if they chose not to follow the directive of the Party; Fu also underscored the earnestness of the Disciplinary Commission and the Judicial Yuan in protecting the reputation of the Control Yuan throughout the case, as well as the Disciplinary Commission’s position and desire to avoid misunderstanding with the Control Yuan; the Disciplinary Commission also pleaded with the Presidential Palace and the Party’s Central Committee (especially Secretary-General Gu Fengxiang and the Fourth Small Group) to intervene in an effort to prevent the Taiwanese newspapers from publicising the case. This year, the Control Yuan sought to impeach the Division-Chief Judge Chen Qinqian and the (Presiding) Judge Jiang Boxing of the Taiwan High Court for covering up the crimes of a drug dealer named Zhang Shui and even aiding and abetting drug trafficking; the case was referred by the Control Yuan to the Disciplinary Commission, whose opinion was initially divided on whether both of the judges should be suspended from duty; Minister of Judicial Administration Zheng Yanfen had given Fu a broad hint that he was hoping to see that neither of his judges would be suspended from duty, a result which would inevitably enrage the ombudsmen; the Disciplinary Commission eventually reached a verdict that only required Judge Jiang Boxing to be suspended from duty, a decision that was agreed by both Fu and President Xie Guansheng. Fu noted in the diary that Judge Jiang Boxing had earned a reputation for lacking fairness and impartiality in handling cases and was actually involved in another case that had been brought before the Disciplinary Commission. Another case to be heard by the Disciplinary Commission involved a Prosecutor of the Jilong District Court named Dai Yushan; Dai had unlawfully seized a bus driver and detained a Municipal Councillor; the incidents had enraged the Legislative Yuan, the Control Yuan as well the local Councils, with the Control Yuan members launching an investigation into the incidents; it also raised the issue of the extent of freedom of speech of the local Councillors and ombudsmen; the diary mentions that the Justices of the Judicial Yuan had failed to agree on this issue; it also notes how President Xie Guansheng and Fu had to tried to harmonise their views on the question; Fu wrote that he was pleased with the way Zheng Yanfen had handled the case. The Disciplinary Commission faced pressure again from members of the Control Yuan in a case involving Zhou Dewei, the Director General of the Inspectorate-General of Customs, with quite a number of accomplices from the External Trade Council and the Ministry of Finance; Zhou was impeached by a number of Control Yuan members who demanded a severe penalty; though he was said to be a man of unquestionable personal integrity, Zhou had a reputation for speaking off the cuff (because he thought he had the backing of the Vice President), which had offended many people and made him deeply unpopular with many members of the Control Yuan; President Xie Guansheng, who was afraid of engaging in another battle with the Control Yuan, was anxious to avoid misunderstanding the Control Yuan members and proposed delaying the hearing until the end of the year; Fu noted that the Commission had no choice but to handle the case in accordance with the law. Another case brought before the Disciplinary Commission by the Control Yuan involved personnel of the Yunlin City Government and the Chairman of the city’s Party Committee, who were impeached for alleged malpractices and election fraud in the Fishermen’s Association election, and who were eventually suspended from duty; the ombudsmen were pleased with the Disciplinary Commission’s decision.
Apart from highlighting those specific disciplinary cases, the 1965 diary also covers other issues relating to the work of the Disciplinary Commission and the Ministry of Judicial Administration. Fu noted the postponed departure of the Disciplinary Commission’s accountant Wang Jun, who was able and popular with the Commissioners. The diary also provides further insights into the continuing process of revising the Public Functionaries Discipline Act. The KMT Central Standing Committee was said to have entrusted the Judicial Yuan with the task of preparing an alternative draft of the revised Public Functionaries Discipline Act, which, together with the original draft, would be submitted for further scrutiny by the Central Standing Committee; Fu noted that the Control Yuan was opposed to the original revision too, and that the reasons for its objection were identical to those given by the Disciplinary Commission, which had serious reservations about the constitutionality of the originally proposed amendments and their underpinning principles put forward by the Central Standing Committee. As to the business of the Ministry of Judicial Administration, Fu noted Zheng Yanfen’s decision to replace Xia Weishang with Zhou Xuanguan as the Chief Prosecutor of the Taiwan High Prosecutors Office, and to appoint Xia Weishang as a Prosecutor of the Supreme Prosecutors Office. In January, the Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Judicial Administration uncovered an unprecedentedly massive fraud scheme of manufacturing counterfeit money. As to the Li Caifa case, Li was sentenced to death for allegedly killing Wu Jiayuan after the Taiwan High Court reheard his case; and the case had been once again referred to the Supreme Court. With regard to the case involving Ma Chaojun, the Overseas Community Affairs Council was said to have taken over the building business from the Federation of Overseas Chinese Associations (because ten million had been appropriated by the Executive Yuan to fund the building costs), and as a result, Ma had already been relieved of the administrative responsibility in January; however, Fu noted that the lawsuit that had been filed against Ma had to be resolved, and he suggested Ma Chaojun to discuss this with Gu Ruxun, who was Fu’s right-hand man at the Disciplinary Commission.
The diary covers some interesting dynamics of the R.O.C.’s diplomacy in 1965. In January, Fu went to the Executive Yuan to brief Premier Yan Jiagan on his official trip to Chile and Mexico at the end of last year, including the situation in these two countries and his meetings with friends during the trip; Fu praised Ambassador to Chile, Tang Wu, for his hard work and dedication, and suggested that Ambassador Gu Fengshan should have no problems working together with (former Ambassador) Feng Zhizheng in Mexico; Yan Jiagan politely apologised for having to ask Fu to go on with the mission to Mexico, and explained the reasons why he had had to choose him as the government’s special envoy to attend the country’s presidential inauguration ceremony. This year, the diary notes the official visit of the Liberian Vice President as well as a visiting British delegation comprising members of the House of Lords.
President Chiang Kai-shek seemed to have taken a relatively more optimistic view about the overall diplomatic situation facing the country in his remarks at the Party’s Central Standing Committee early this year, as recent international developments were said to have become more favourable. The American and Japanese leaders issued a joint statement that emphasised support for the R.O.C., but failed to agree on the question of trade with Communist China. Madam Chiang Kai-shek praised the U.S. position on Vietnam after the Johnson administration stepped up military intervention to combat the Communist forces in Vietnam. At the joint symposium of the KMT Central Advisory Committee and the Central Policy Committee in April, Foreign Minister Shen Changhuan suggested in his report on the diplomatic circumstances that, the bombing raids in North Vietnam carried out last year marked the greatest change in U.S. policy; U.S. military personnel stationed in Vietnam were no longer military advisers as they were going to be involved in the war as actual combatants after 7th February; the Americans had finally come to realise that they had previously underestimated the ambitions of the Communists and overestimated the power of the Chinese Communists. Shen Chuanghuan claimed that, outside the United Nations, the R.O.C.’s diplomatic standing was not as bad as might have been feared, because countries around the world continued to value their relations with the R.O.C. and had great regard for the country’s military power and economic achievements.
However, the Foreign Minister admitted on the same occasion that it had become increasingly difficult to preserve the R.O.C.’s place within the United Nations, citing the huge political pressure on the R.O.C. regarding the country’s U.N. membership fees and the its inability to join as many as 33 United Nations commissions, as the United States, fearful of complete Soviet withdrawal from the United Nations, was said to have yielded to Soviet pressure on those issues. According to the Foreign Minister’s report, the R.O.C.’s diplomatic standing in the Third World seemed to present a mixed picture: while Central and South American countries by and large remained friendly towards the R.O.C., Taipei had lost the lead in the diplomatic race in Africa to Beijing (which had overtaken Taipei by having more African states in favour of formal relations with Communist China after it managed to secure the recognition of three more French-speaking countries in the region recently), with nineteen African states now recognising the People’s Republic of China, fifteen maintaining diplomatic relations with the R.O.C., and three remaining neutral; and Zhou Enlai’s recent visit to Africa was said to be unsuccessful because it had failed to make significant inroads into Republican China’s place in the region. In Macao, the R.O.C.’s Foreign Ministry was forced to close down its representative office there because of pressure on the Portuguese Macao government from the Chinese Communists; and the R.O.C. government had hinted to the Portuguese authorities that Taipei understood its difficult position and would forgive its decision. In Hong Kong, the Chinese Communists were said to have been carrying out their economic activities in a ‘quite frightening’ way. Beijing had reportedly discontinued its attack on President Chiang Kai-shek in 1965 because it viewed the disagreement between Taipei and Washington over the question of ‘counterattack and national recovery’ as an opportunity to be exploited. This year, the French government eventually bowed to Beijing’s pressure by formally demanding the Education and Culture Division of the R.O.C. mission in Paris move out of its former embassy building, which had been used as a venue for KMT Party meetings and functions after the R.O.C. broke off relations with France; Vice Foreign Minister Yang Xikun had been using this place to summon a number of meetings attended by diplomats as well as personnel from the Central News Agency and the KMT Party Committees; Fu wrote that it would be a big joke if the government was still hoping to use Paris as a base to conduct European diplomacy and drum up support from European countries after the severing of diplomatic relations with France. By contrast, relations with Italy seemed to have been on the right track, thanks to the good work of Ambassador Yu Junji, who even managed to bring home a trade mission as well as a parliamentary delegation from Italy this year.
Yu Junji told Fu that since his return from Italy he had been summoned to meet President Chiang five times, and the President, who appeared to be very pleased with his work, had at one point even considered appointing him as Foreign Minister, but the idea had reportedly met strong opposition from many people within the Foreign Ministry; Shen Changhuan was said to have been interested in the ambassadorial post in Washington DC, but later changed his mind for fear that Yu Junji might not be a cooperative and supportive Foreign Minister that he would have to deal with. Yu also told Fu about his relationship with Ye Gongchao (who was not nice to him), and recalled his previous experience of working with Jiang Tingfu at the United Nations, where he had found Jiang to be a rather stubborn, ungrateful and jealous colleague. Fu noted in the diary that not only was Zhang Qun extremely dissatisfied with Ye Gongchao, but even Chiang Ching-kuo, who used to be on friendly terms with Ye, had been offended by his arrogance during his official visit to the United States, and their relationship had deteriorated thereafter. Fu also noted that Jiang Tingfu had resigned as Chinese Ambassador to the United States and was replaced by Zhou Shukai this year.
The diary also mentions a number of other ambassadorial postings. For instance, Ambassador to Liberia Chen Daichu was said to have a bad relationship with the Liberian authorities; Fu wrote that this might be due to her wife’s discrimination against the African people, and that former Minister of Economic Affairs Yang Jizeng had been earmarked as the successor to Chen in Liberia. Ambassador to Libya Chen Zhiping, who had wished to retire on health grounds, had to take up the ambassadorial post in Mexico; and Fu advised him to trust Feng Zhizheng and seek Feng’s advice should he encounter any difficulties or problems there. Fu was pleased that Ambassador Duan Maolan was posted to Côte d’Ivoire rather than to Paris again. In the diary, Fu grieved the death of his old friend, Wang Huacheng, who was the R.O.C.’s last Minister to Portugal and died of heart attack in the United States in 1965.
The diary contains references to some of the major developments in world politics in 1965. Relations between Communist China and the Soviet Union did not improve in 1965. Cold War rivalries continued to dominate relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, but both superpowers were making their best endeavours to avoid a nuclear war. The Soviet Union, which was lagging far behind the United States in industrial and agricultural development, was seeking cooperation with America as leaders of the socialist superpower were gradually abandoning the command economy in favour of capitalist economic policies, which had effectively rendered any cooperation with the Chinese Communists impossible. The situation in Central and Eastern Europe showed a similar trend; countries such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania had gradually adopted capitalist policies and the principle of profit-maximisation, had improved their industrial and agricultural development, and enhanced economic cooperation and trade with Western Europe; the Soviet Union had also relaxed its control over Central and Eastern Europe while those states were slowly being steered away from Soviet influence. Fu noted that those developments, which were said to be what he had anticipated years ago, were the natural consequences of the inevitable failure of the Communist experiment around the world. Western Europe was also edging towards greater cooperation with Eastern Europe. For example, West Germany was considering revising its policy of having no diplomatic relations with those countries that recognised East Germany; and Belgium was supporting the Polish proposal for a ‘Nuclear Free Central Europe’. France was said to have changed its attitude towards the United States, but de Gaulle’s proposition was no longer seen as some sort of wishful thinking or expression of brazen self-aggrandisement. In the United States, the diary notes the small circle of decision-makers surrounding President Johnson, including people such as Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Llewellyn Thompson and Thomas C. Mann; at the State Department, William Averell Harriman, who was appointed Ambassador-at-Large this year, was said to be outside President Johnson’s trusted inner circle; Fu regretted Harriman’s departure as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, lamenting that the R.O.C. had just lost another friend and sympathetic voice at the Department of State. In North Africa, the struggle between the Soviet Union and Communist China for influence was said to have resulted in a coup in Algeria this year; however, the new Algerian regime not only had a government opposed to the Chinese Communists, but also refused to become a Soviet satellite state; instead, it adopted a pro-U.S. and pro-French posture for economic reasons. In East Asia, Japan had been making great strides in post-war industrial recovery; its industrial capacity was already ranked fifth in the world (after the United States, the Soviet Union, West Germany and Britain). The country had recently endeavored to develop an independent foreign policy in world politics, especially in its relations with Asian countries; apart from an unequivocal expression of Japanese willingness to take part in the Afro-Asian Conference, there were clear indications of Japanese intention to pursue an independent course of action on a range of questions including the United Nations, Malaysia, Communist China and Taiwan in Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Satō’s talks with President Johnson in the United States this year. In Hong Kong, a bank run, which was precipitated by an overheated property market, occurred in 1965; it had culminated in a serious banking crisis that threatened the survival of many local Chinese banking houses. In January, President Sukarno formally announced Indonesia’s withdrawal from the United Nations in protest at Malaysia’s election to the United Nations Security Council; Fu was somewhat baffled by Sukarno’s reckless decision and his ignorance. It seems that Fu had been paying special attention to the situation in Latin America since his visit to Mexico and Chile last year; In this diary, readers may find interesting observations of the political and economic developments in this region in general and in countries such as Chile, Peru, and Brazil in particular.
The most important international event featured in this year’s diary is the escalating conflict in Vietnam as the country slipped into war in 1965. Fu noted the gradual hardening of the Johnson administration’s policy as the U.S. President had been forced by a series of military provocations by the Vietnamese Communists (such as the car bombing of the American Embassy in Saigon in March) to step up direct military intervention in Vietnam in response to the growing threats posed by North Vietnam and Communist China. U.S. troops were sent in and were authorised to engage the enemy and fight shoulder to shoulder with the South Vietnamese forces; air strikes against North Vietnam were carried out by the U.S. Air Force; expecting its allies (including Thailand, the R.O.C., Malaysia, the Philippines, the R.O.K., Australia and New Zealand) to offer their support, the Johnson administration even vowed punitive sanctions against those countries (such as Canada, India, Indonesia and Egypt) that refused to cooperate with or opposed America’s anti-Communist policy by preparing to stop or reduce U.S. aid to those states. The United States even threatened to attack Communist China by carrying out aerial bombing campaigns, invading the Chinese mainland and even using nuclear weapons should the Chinese Communists decide to intervene militarily. Fu was very pleased with the display of American resolve as evidenced by the Johnson administration’s policy departure, which he thought had been long overdue. The diary also notes the growing domestic opposition to the Johnson administration’s war policy. In this regard, Fu expressed in the diary his disapproval of the policy orientation of the so-called leftist liberals (even including the Kennedy brothers) as well as the policy position advocated by some American newspapers such as the Newsweek Magazine, (which, unlike Time Magazine, advocated the United States seeking peace talks, withdrawing troops, and to refrain from intervening in Asia and Africa, etc.). Nonetheless, opinion polls suggested majority support for Johnson’s tough policy.
The situation within South Vietnam and North Vietnam was said to be very difficult. In February, a coup took place in South Vietnam but was immediately put down. In North Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh’s power and influence were said to be weakening; its power centre was divided with cadres splitting into three groups – the pro-Soviets, the pro-Chinese, and the centrists; lives were miserable in North Vietnam, which was said to be in favour of a peace settlement but did not dare to ask for it. The North Vietnamese were said to have very ambivalent feelings towards the Chinese Communists: on the one hand, they were upset that Communist China failed to turn their words into concrete actions by joining the war; on the other hand, North Vietnam was extremely fearful of an invasion of the Chinese Communist troops. The North Vietnamese reportedly would welcome the Soviet army and seek to counterbalance the influence of Chinese Communists with the Soviet support; nonetheless, the amount of Soviet aid, which had matched that of Chinese aid during the period between 1954 and 1958, had been reduced after 1958 as the North Vietnamese were seen as pro-Chinese.
The role of the Chinese Communists was also covered in the diary, which notes that there had been a gross overestimation of Chinese military power and Mao Zedong in fact was keen to avoid a war with the United States; and it was suggested that, given the extreme agricultural and economic difficulties at home, it would only be suicidal for Beijing to entangle itself in a war in Vietnam. Fu also noted Chiang Kai-shek’s assessment of the situation in Vietnam, with the President suggesting in April that he was no longer hopeful about the prospect of negotiating a peace settlement under the current circumstances, because the Chinese Communists were adopting an offensive posture vis-à-vis the United States and would therefore never give in to the Americans on Vietnam; according to Chiang’s assessment, the Chinese Communists were in fact intending to drag the Soviet Union into a war with the United States under the terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, since the Treaty would oblige the Soviet Union to intervene militarily in the event of an armed attack on Communist China by the United States.
The diary also touches upon some aspects of the history of the Second World War. For instance, the newly published personal memoirs of former British Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister Anthony Eden attributed the world’s post-1945 mess to U.S. President Roosevelt’s faults. Fu indicated in the diary that he at least partially agreed with what Eden said in the book, and suggested that some of what Roosevelt was accused of doing in the first half of the 1940s (including his secret deal with Stalin on Manchuria at the expense of China’s interests) were exactly what he had learned in Moscow from his British and American counterparts who had attended the Yalta Conference. Fu also recorded what Zhang Lisheng had learned about the final diplomatic manoeuvres by Imperial Japan before the Yalta Conference and how Japan was deceived by the Soviet Union as the Japanese Emperor’s message to Britain and the United States (concerning Japan’s willingness to accept unconditional surrender) had been twisted by Stalin who told the British and Americans that Japan would fight to death.
This year, Fu learned that his son, Zhongxiong, had relocated to Rutland in England and was pleased to know that he had become an established civil servant with the Royal Air Force, holding a rank equivalent to that of a Squadron Leader of the Royal Air Force (空軍少校) and with an annual salary of about £1500; Zhongxiong also told his father that he was able to pay off the mortgage that had been taken out by his mother in due course, and the proceeds from the sale of the shares in the Hong Kong Restaurant business had been spent to purchase houses, which could generate good rental earnings; Zhongxiong also indicated that his two half-sisters (Jintu and Jinxuan) could stay at his place and would be taken care of should they choose to come to study in Britain. Fu’s granddaughter Yee Wah told him that she had begun boarding at a school in England. Fu tried to console his daughter, Jintu, who had performed poorly in her exams this year. Fu was glad when his youngest daughter, Jinxuan, managed to come second in a seal cutting competition at her school; but Fu had been extremely anxious for Jinxuan’s wellbeing after being told by her sister one day about her situation, which had left him sleepless at night on that day and caused him a headache for some time. Fu sent his eldest daughter Huiming and her husband Kitty’s photo(s) as well as a photo of the signing of the Four-Power Declaration with his autograph. Fu’s concubine in Hong Kong continued to receive financial support from the son of Fu’s deceased cousin, Chunzhi, who visited Taiwan twice in 1965. The marriage between Fu’s Tenth Sister seemed to have broken down irretrievably. Fu’s nephew, Dehui, had ambitions to qualify as a lawyer. Fu faced some difficulties in helping Nianzhi get a formal job with Bank of Taiwan. Wu Chaoshu’s son, Wu Jingren visited Taiwan from Hong Kong, and was granted an audience with President Chiang, who happened to be too busy with military affairs and had to let Zhang Qun meet him and Fu. His friends and family members in Hong Kong had been affected following the outbreak of a banking crisis in Hong Kong in 1965; and Fu was very sorry to hear that his Seventh Brother, Zhou Junnian, unfortunately became targeted by depositors of the Guangdong Trust Bank that had run into trouble and been forced into liquidation in the banking crisis.
On the eve of Chinese New Year, Fu expressed his deep anxiety over the country’s prospects, lamenting the unfavourable international situation facing the R.O.C. Early his year, Fu was being congratulated by his colleagues and friends who warmly celebrated his 70th birthday on several occasions. Fu grieved the death of Winston Churchill this year, as well as the passing of old friends such as Zhang Mojun, Xu Chongzhi, Liu Zhengyu and Huang Xingtang as he looked back on their decades of comradeship. This year, Fu shared his views on the situation in Soviet Russia and East Europe with a journalist on condition of anonymity. He also provided a journalist with information about Chile. In 1965, Fu had known that he was in poor health, and had decided never to visit the wine house, especially after he suffered from arthritis, foot pain, abdominal pain and diarrhoea according to this diary. Fu continued practising Tai Chi at home on a regular basis this year. He also remained committed to the work of the Photographic Society of China, where he continued to take part in the (Third) World Photographic Exhibition as one of the juries for black and white photos, and was invited to present the Fellows (FPSC) and Associates (APSC) of the Photographic Society of China with their certificates on behalf of the Society. This year, Fu was prepared to embark on a trip with his friends, Huang Liang and Yang Gongda, to Central and Southern Taiwan starting from 15th July.
Like the previous diaries, the 1964 diary provides a few anecdotes about some of Fu’s contemporaries, such as Ye Gongchao’s affair with his mistress, Kong Xiangxi’s almost irretrievable fall-out with his wife over matters concerning their children, as well as Yu Youren’s strange fears for his own safety (as he was said to have lived in constant fear that he might be killed by the servicemen and therefore proceeded with the utmost caution to avoid making an enemy of any military personnel). Fu also noted in the diary a major road incident at Yangmingshan that caused 99 student casualties.
Fu’s diary ended on 14th July, two weeks before the diarist died of heart attack on 29th July 1965.